Nagesh Bhushan Chuppala
As the clock ticks towards the 2026 delimitation exercise, India confronts a constitutional conundrum that could redefine its federal architecture. The freeze on Lok Sabha seats, a relic of the 1971 census imposed to encourage population control, is set to expire. When the next census—delayed by the pandemic but now slated for completion by mid-2026—furnishes fresh demographic data, the arithmetic will be unforgiving. Uttar Pradesh, with a projected population of 240m, could see its parliamentary tally balloon from 80 to 128 seats. Bihar might climb from 40 to 70. By contrast, the southern states, having tamed their fertility rates through decades of investment in education and health, face stagnation: Tamil Nadu edging up from 39 to 41, Kerala possibly slipping from 20 to 19. This north-south divergence is not mere electoral trivia; it threatens to erode the delicate equilibrium of India’s union, rewarding demographic laxity while penalising governance.
Rahul Gandhi, the Congress scion and Leader of the Opposition, has long styled himself as the defender of India as a “union of states”. His recent broadsides against the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its ideological parent, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), for “capturing” the Indian state have sharpened the debate. Yet rhetoric alone will not suffice. Mr Gandhi has a bolder, if riskier, card to play: championing the creation of smaller states before delimitation to preempt the northern juggernaut and restore federal parity. This is no flight of fancy; it is a pragmatic recalibration rooted in history, economics, and political necessity. The arguments are manifold, the counterarguments fierce, and the rebuttals resolute.The Imperative of ReorganisationFirst, federal equilibrium demands it. Delimitation, as currently conceived, violates the spirit of cooperative federalism enshrined in the Constitution. By pegging representation to raw population, it punishes southern states—whose total fertility rates (TFRs) hover below replacement level (Kerala at 1.6, Tamil Nadu at 1.7)—for their successes, while rewarding northern laggards with TFRs above 2.5. Carving Uttar Pradesh into four viable units—Purvanchal, Awadh, Bundelkhand, and Paschimanchal, each with 40m-60m people—would cap any single entity at 50-60 seats, preventing one state from overshadowing the south’s collective voice. This is not gerrymandering; it is rebalancing, in line with B.R. Ambedkar’s vision of compact states to avert administrative paralysis.
Second, governance thrives in smaller vessels. Uttar Pradesh’s 75 districts form a bureaucratic behemoth; its chief minister is a distant overlord. Post-bifurcation evidence is instructive: Chhattisgarh, severed from Madhya Pradesh in 2000, reduced Naxal-affected districts from 14 to 8, boosted forest cover by 3%, and outpaced its parent in GSDP growth by 2.1 percentage points annually from 2001 to 2010. Uttarakhand doubled hydropower generation and saw tourist arrivals rise 180% in 15 years. Proximity breeds accountability; gigantism fosters apathy.
Third, sub-regional identities crave expression. Within Uttar Pradesh, Bundelkhand endures chronic drought and out-migration; Purvanchal grapples with floods; Paschimanchal hums with industrial potential. Uniform policies from Lucknow fail them all. Smaller states enable tailored strategies—irrigation in Bundelkhand, flood defences in Purvanchal, skill corridors in the west. This is devolution, not division.
Fourth, politics benefits from fragmentation. The BJP’s northern dominance rests on three pillars: Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar. Smaller states would splinter this monolith, spawning regional parties and coalition imperatives. Telangana’s 2014 birth disrupted Andhra Pradesh’s bipolarity; a similar fission could yield Purvanchal agrarian movements or Bundelkhandi revivalists—potential Congress partners in a post-2029 dispensation.
Fifth, demographic justice requires it. Southern progress in women’s literacy and healthcare should not translate into political eclipse. Pairing smaller states with a seat freeze until 2041 would grant northern states breathing room to converge on population norms without immediate penalties.
Sixth, federal checks strengthen. A Rajya Sabha expanded to 300-350 members with 40-50 states would amplify the upper house’s role as a brake on majoritarian excess. Smaller states also empower local democracy: Chhattisgarh allocates ₹32,000 per capita to panchayats annually, versus Uttar Pradesh’s ₹18,000. A “Panchayati Raj 2.0” could mandate one-third of state budgets to grassroots bodies.
Seventh, precedent and process are established. Congress midwifed Haryana (1966) and Himachal Pradesh (1971); the BJP delivered Telangana, Jharkhand, and Uttarakhand. Article 3 empowers Parliament to form new states by simple majority. A National Reorganisation Commission, modelled on the 1953 Dhar panel, could ensure transparency through public hearings and viability studies.The Counterarguments—and RebuttalsBalkanisation
Critics warn of a fractured India, a patchwork of feuding statelets eroding national cohesion.
Rebuttal: India already manages 28 states and eight Union territories; adding 10-12 is incremental evolution. Germany’s 16 Länder and America’s 50 states function without disintegration. Imposed unity in oversized states fuels alienation—witness demands for Vidarbha or Harit Pradesh. Smaller units channel aspirations, preventing separatist surges.
Fiscal Burden
More chief ministers, more secretariats, more strain on the exchequer.
Rebuttal: The 15th Finance Commission shows smaller states spend 18% less per capita on administration owing to streamlined bureaucracies. Jharkhand’s overhead fell 12% post-split; Chhattisgarh’s 15%. The true fiscal black hole is inefficiency in leviathans—Uttar Pradesh’s ₹1.2trn revenue deficit in 2024-25 dwarfs Telangana’s surplus.
Cultural Dilution
Splitting Uttar Pradesh would shatter its Ganga-Jamuni syncretism.
Rebuttal: Culture predates administrative boundaries. Awadh’s nawabi refinement, Bundelkhand’s Bundeli folklore, Purvanchal’s Bhojpuri vitality existed before 1950. Smaller states preserve sub-cultures by granting political agency—Telangana’s Bathukamma festivals flourish alongside Andhra’s traditions.
Coalition Instability
A proliferation of regional satraps would paralyse national governments.
Rebuttal: The 1990s coalition era delivered 8% GDP growth, telecom liberalisation, and nuclear tests. Fragmentation forces negotiation, benefiting pan-India parties like Congress over regionally concentrated ones like the BJP.
Boundary Arbitrariness
Who draws the lines? The process risks caste and communal conflagrations.
Rebuttal: A Reorganisation Commission with data-driven criteria—population, geography, economic viability—and public consultations mitigates chaos. The 1956 States Reorganisation Act succeeded despite tensions because it followed the Fazl Ali Commission’s rigour.
Southern Inconsistency
Southern leaders demand northern splits but resist their own (Rayalaseema, Saurashtra).
Rebuttal: The principle is equity, not uniformity. If sub-regions anywhere demand statehood, let the Commission adjudicate. Mr Gandhi can advocate national reorganisation to deflect hypocrisy charges.
Political Opportunism
This is Congress delaying delimitation to cling to southern bastions.
Rebuttal: Delimitation is inevitable; preemptive reform is strategy. The BJP’s “One Nation, One Election” is equally calculative. Congress governed with southern allies for decades without such demands; the threat is structural, not partisan.A Roadmap for Mr GandhiMr Gandhi should eschew cartographic grandstanding. Instead, table a Federal Equity Bill with three pillars: a National Reorganisation Commission by 2027; a Lok Sabha seat freeze until 2041 with devolution bonuses for low-TFR states; and mandatory local-body funding in new states. Court southern allies (DMK, CPI(M), BRS) and northern sub-regional leaders alike. Frame it as Ambedkarite renewal: devolution, not dismemberment.
Delimitation looms like a demographic tsunami. Smaller states offer a seawall—imperfect, but essential. The risks are tangible: cost, conflict, complexity. Yet inaction courts graver peril: a Parliament where the south is marginalised, federalism hollowed, and governance failures perpetuated. Mr Gandhi need not prevail today; he must ignite the debate before the census inks India’s federal destiny. The republic was forged in reorganisation in 1956. It may need another dose to endure.
Rahul Gandhi, the Congress scion and Leader of the Opposition, has long styled himself as the defender of India as a “union of states”. His recent broadsides against the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its ideological parent, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), for “capturing” the Indian state have sharpened the debate. Yet rhetoric alone will not suffice. Mr Gandhi has a bolder, if riskier, card to play: championing the creation of smaller states before delimitation to preempt the northern juggernaut and restore federal parity. This is no flight of fancy; it is a pragmatic recalibration rooted in history, economics, and political necessity. The arguments are manifold, the counterarguments fierce, and the rebuttals resolute.The Imperative of ReorganisationFirst, federal equilibrium demands it. Delimitation, as currently conceived, violates the spirit of cooperative federalism enshrined in the Constitution. By pegging representation to raw population, it punishes southern states—whose total fertility rates (TFRs) hover below replacement level (Kerala at 1.6, Tamil Nadu at 1.7)—for their successes, while rewarding northern laggards with TFRs above 2.5. Carving Uttar Pradesh into four viable units—Purvanchal, Awadh, Bundelkhand, and Paschimanchal, each with 40m-60m people—would cap any single entity at 50-60 seats, preventing one state from overshadowing the south’s collective voice. This is not gerrymandering; it is rebalancing, in line with B.R. Ambedkar’s vision of compact states to avert administrative paralysis.
Second, governance thrives in smaller vessels. Uttar Pradesh’s 75 districts form a bureaucratic behemoth; its chief minister is a distant overlord. Post-bifurcation evidence is instructive: Chhattisgarh, severed from Madhya Pradesh in 2000, reduced Naxal-affected districts from 14 to 8, boosted forest cover by 3%, and outpaced its parent in GSDP growth by 2.1 percentage points annually from 2001 to 2010. Uttarakhand doubled hydropower generation and saw tourist arrivals rise 180% in 15 years. Proximity breeds accountability; gigantism fosters apathy.
Third, sub-regional identities crave expression. Within Uttar Pradesh, Bundelkhand endures chronic drought and out-migration; Purvanchal grapples with floods; Paschimanchal hums with industrial potential. Uniform policies from Lucknow fail them all. Smaller states enable tailored strategies—irrigation in Bundelkhand, flood defences in Purvanchal, skill corridors in the west. This is devolution, not division.
Fourth, politics benefits from fragmentation. The BJP’s northern dominance rests on three pillars: Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar. Smaller states would splinter this monolith, spawning regional parties and coalition imperatives. Telangana’s 2014 birth disrupted Andhra Pradesh’s bipolarity; a similar fission could yield Purvanchal agrarian movements or Bundelkhandi revivalists—potential Congress partners in a post-2029 dispensation.
Fifth, demographic justice requires it. Southern progress in women’s literacy and healthcare should not translate into political eclipse. Pairing smaller states with a seat freeze until 2041 would grant northern states breathing room to converge on population norms without immediate penalties.
Sixth, federal checks strengthen. A Rajya Sabha expanded to 300-350 members with 40-50 states would amplify the upper house’s role as a brake on majoritarian excess. Smaller states also empower local democracy: Chhattisgarh allocates ₹32,000 per capita to panchayats annually, versus Uttar Pradesh’s ₹18,000. A “Panchayati Raj 2.0” could mandate one-third of state budgets to grassroots bodies.
Seventh, precedent and process are established. Congress midwifed Haryana (1966) and Himachal Pradesh (1971); the BJP delivered Telangana, Jharkhand, and Uttarakhand. Article 3 empowers Parliament to form new states by simple majority. A National Reorganisation Commission, modelled on the 1953 Dhar panel, could ensure transparency through public hearings and viability studies.The Counterarguments—and RebuttalsBalkanisation
Critics warn of a fractured India, a patchwork of feuding statelets eroding national cohesion.
Rebuttal: India already manages 28 states and eight Union territories; adding 10-12 is incremental evolution. Germany’s 16 Länder and America’s 50 states function without disintegration. Imposed unity in oversized states fuels alienation—witness demands for Vidarbha or Harit Pradesh. Smaller units channel aspirations, preventing separatist surges.
Fiscal Burden
More chief ministers, more secretariats, more strain on the exchequer.
Rebuttal: The 15th Finance Commission shows smaller states spend 18% less per capita on administration owing to streamlined bureaucracies. Jharkhand’s overhead fell 12% post-split; Chhattisgarh’s 15%. The true fiscal black hole is inefficiency in leviathans—Uttar Pradesh’s ₹1.2trn revenue deficit in 2024-25 dwarfs Telangana’s surplus.
Cultural Dilution
Splitting Uttar Pradesh would shatter its Ganga-Jamuni syncretism.
Rebuttal: Culture predates administrative boundaries. Awadh’s nawabi refinement, Bundelkhand’s Bundeli folklore, Purvanchal’s Bhojpuri vitality existed before 1950. Smaller states preserve sub-cultures by granting political agency—Telangana’s Bathukamma festivals flourish alongside Andhra’s traditions.
Coalition Instability
A proliferation of regional satraps would paralyse national governments.
Rebuttal: The 1990s coalition era delivered 8% GDP growth, telecom liberalisation, and nuclear tests. Fragmentation forces negotiation, benefiting pan-India parties like Congress over regionally concentrated ones like the BJP.
Boundary Arbitrariness
Who draws the lines? The process risks caste and communal conflagrations.
Rebuttal: A Reorganisation Commission with data-driven criteria—population, geography, economic viability—and public consultations mitigates chaos. The 1956 States Reorganisation Act succeeded despite tensions because it followed the Fazl Ali Commission’s rigour.
Southern Inconsistency
Southern leaders demand northern splits but resist their own (Rayalaseema, Saurashtra).
Rebuttal: The principle is equity, not uniformity. If sub-regions anywhere demand statehood, let the Commission adjudicate. Mr Gandhi can advocate national reorganisation to deflect hypocrisy charges.
Political Opportunism
This is Congress delaying delimitation to cling to southern bastions.
Rebuttal: Delimitation is inevitable; preemptive reform is strategy. The BJP’s “One Nation, One Election” is equally calculative. Congress governed with southern allies for decades without such demands; the threat is structural, not partisan.A Roadmap for Mr GandhiMr Gandhi should eschew cartographic grandstanding. Instead, table a Federal Equity Bill with three pillars: a National Reorganisation Commission by 2027; a Lok Sabha seat freeze until 2041 with devolution bonuses for low-TFR states; and mandatory local-body funding in new states. Court southern allies (DMK, CPI(M), BRS) and northern sub-regional leaders alike. Frame it as Ambedkarite renewal: devolution, not dismemberment.
Delimitation looms like a demographic tsunami. Smaller states offer a seawall—imperfect, but essential. The risks are tangible: cost, conflict, complexity. Yet inaction courts graver peril: a Parliament where the south is marginalised, federalism hollowed, and governance failures perpetuated. Mr Gandhi need not prevail today; he must ignite the debate before the census inks India’s federal destiny. The republic was forged in reorganisation in 1956. It may need another dose to endure.
Recommendations to Rahul Gandhi
Table the Federal Equity Bill in the winter session of 2026
Three pillars:National Reorganisation Commission by June 2027
Lok Sabha seat freeze until 2041
Mandatory 33% of state budgets to local bodies in new states
Build a cross-regional coalition
Court southern allies (DMK, CPI(M), BRS) and northern sub-regional leaders (Bundelkhand’s Raja Bhaiya, Purvanchal’s OP Rajbhar). Frame it as Ambedkarite justice.Launch a “Union of Skills” pilot in new states
Tie statehood to youth skilling: 100,000 apprenticeships annually per new state, funded by a 1% cess on large industries. Align with your earlier skill-development vision.superhighways. Smaller states become investment magnets.Neutralise the BJP’s “anti-national” charge
Invoke the BJP’s own Telangana precedent. Dare them to oppose a process they once championed
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