English translated version of " 9వ షెడ్యూల్ లేదా రాజ్యాంగ సవరణ ఏది మనకు ఉత్తమ మార్గం
ఈ రోజు సూర్య దినపత్రిక "
ఒరిజినల్ version ఈ క్రింది విధం గా ఉంది
Published in Surya on 3rd November, 2025
〰️〰️〰️
The 9th Schedule? Or a constitutional amendment to Articles 15(5), 16(4), and Articles 243D(6), 243T(6)?A new argument has surfaced in Telangana regarding 42% BC reservations. Previously, some claimed that 42% BC reservations in education, employment, and local bodies were possible through Government Orders (GOs). However, after courts stayed those GOs, the argument shifted to achieving 42% BC reservations via constitutional amendment. T. Chiranjeevulu of the BC Intellectuals Forum and Justice Eshwarayya have consistently maintained from the beginning that only the Ninth Schedule would be truly useful. Let us examine the strengths, weaknesses, and feasibility of the two competing arguments: constitutional amendment versus the Ninth Schedule.
The State Government’s Bill – The Ninth Schedule Route:
In March 2025, the Telangana government passed Bills No. 3 & 4 in the Assembly, deciding to provide a total of 42% reservations to BCs in education, employment, and local bodies. The bill was sent to the Central Government via the Governor’s approval under Article 31C, requesting its inclusion in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution through a constitutional amendment under Article 31B. This means laws placed in the Ninth Schedule generally receive constitutional protection and are shielded from judicial review. In other words, neither the Supreme Court nor High Courts can easily strike them down.
However, in the 2007 I.R. Coelho vs. State of Tamil Nadu judgment, the Supreme Court clarified that even if a law is in the Ninth Schedule, if it violates the basic structure of the Constitution—such as equality, justice, or fundamental rights—the courts can review it. Tamil Nadu followed this very route, placing its law in the Ninth Schedule to provide 50% BC reservations since 1994. Currently, a petition challenging this law is pending in the Supreme Court. Therefore, inclusion in the Ninth Schedule does not provide absolute protection; it will still face judicial scrutiny. This is why some argue that only amendments to Articles 16(4) (reservations in employment), 15(5) (reservations in educational institutions), and—to lift the 50% ceiling imposed in the K. Krishna Murthy and Vikas Kishan Gawali cases on local bodies—Articles 243D(6) and 243T(6), would offer complete protection.
The Article 16(4) Amendment Route:
Article 16(4) currently states that the State can provide reservations for backward classes not adequately represented. However, per the Supreme Court’s Indra Sawhney (1992) judgment, there is a 50% ceiling. To breach this ceiling, a constitutional amendment is required.
Benefit: If a constitutional amendment explicitly adds to Articles 15(5) and 16(4) that “OBC reservations can exceed 50% based on population and backwardness,” it would become a permanent safeguard.
Feasibility and Challenges:
Article 16(4) states: “Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favor of any backward class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services under the State.” The key phrase is “not adequately represented.” This means reservations must be determined based on the actual lack of representation in employment and education. The Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney vs. Union of India (1992) clearly mandated that reservations must be based on quantifiable data. The government must rely on surveys and commission reports to assess “who is how backward.” The general rule is that reservations must not exceed 50%, and breaching it requires extraordinary justification (Indra Sawhney, para 860(4)).
Similarly, in M. Nagaraj vs. Union of India, the Supreme Court further clarified that before granting or extending reservations (including in promotions), the State must collect quantifiable data on backwardness, inadequate representation, and overall administrative efficiency. In short, a constitutional amendment alone is insufficient; it must be backed by empirical, contemporaneous evidence. This means a commission or expert committee must be formed to gather data on BC population, educational backwardness, representation in government jobs, and socio-economic status. Only then can legal grounds be built to justify reservations above 50%. Without this, courts may strike down the decision as “arbitrary,” “baseless,” or unconstitutional.
The Centre currently lacks such empirical quantifiable data nationwide, so it would only become available after a caste census. A commission would need to justify why reservations above 50% are necessary in a way that withstands judicial review before amending the Constitution. Only then would an Article 16(4) amendment gain the strength to survive in court. Quantifiable and empirical data is mandatory for changing Article 16(4) or exceeding 50% reservations. Without it, there’s a high chance of being struck down.
Constitutional amendments are beyond the powers of states; only Parliament can amend the Constitution, requiring the Centre to undertake this exercise. It would take at least two years. However, Telangana already has a caste census report and a Dedicated Commission report. The Assembly has passed these two bills and sent them to the Centre. If the Centre wishes, it could act within a week.
Amending Article 16(4) requires a constitutional amendment.
Placing a law in the Ninth Schedule also requires a constitutional amendment.
For Telangana alone, the Centre amending Article 16(4) is impossible—any amendment would apply nationwide. The groundwork is already prepared; the “meal is cooked,” but there’s no one to serve it. If the Centre approves it in the upcoming winter session and adds it to the Ninth Schedule, it could come into effect immediately.
For Telangana alone, the Centre amending Article 16(4) is impossible—any amendment would apply nationwide. The groundwork is already prepared; the “meal is cooked,” but there’s no one to serve it. If the Centre approves it in the upcoming winter session and adds it to the Ninth Schedule, it could come into effect immediately.
Constitutional Amendments Are Not Immune to Judicial Review
Of the 106 constitutional amendments so far, the Supreme Court has struck down six. The 42nd Amendment attempted to bar judicial review of constitutional amendments; the 32nd Amendment via Article 371(C) tried to remove High Courts’ review powers; and the BJP government’s 99th Amendment (2014) proposed replacing the collegium system with a National Judicial Appointments Commission—the Supreme Court struck it down. Thus, there’s no guarantee that Article 16(4) amendments won’t be overturned.
As for the Ninth Schedule, 284 laws have been added so far, and the Supreme Court has not struck down a single one.Some argue that just as the 103rd Constitutional Amendment provided 10% EWS reservations for forward castes, a similar amendment would suffice here. True, the 103rd Amendment also faced judicial review but survived by a 3:2 majority. The EWS reservation was passed and implemented within days in 2019. Will the ruling powers take BC reservations as seriously? Do they have the same sincerity toward BCs?
In the 2022 Janhit Abhiyan and All India Backward Classes Federation vs. Union of India cases, the Supreme Court upheld EWS reservations, clarifying that the 50% reservation ceiling is not part of the Constitution’s basic structure. Since EWS is based on economic (not social) backwardness, the 50% limit under Articles 15(6) & 16(6) does not apply. In my opinion, this judgment is somewhat useful for us.Three Systems We Must Confront for BC Reservation Bills/Laws
- The Legislature – Dominated by Upper/Dominant Castes
EWS reservations benefited upper castes, so all upper-caste parties (except DMK, RJD, BSP, and Communists) supported it and implemented it nationwide within a week. Expecting the same cooperation for BCs is wishful thinking. Historically, Jansangh/BJP withdrew support from Karpoori Thakur’s government in Bihar (1979) and V.P. Singh’s central government (1990) over OBC reservations. The current BJP initially delayed Telangana’s bills for the Ninth Schedule with various excuses. It’s unthinkable that this BJP-led Centre would amend Articles 16(4) and 15(5) for OBCs. - The Judiciary
The judiciary has often delivered strict verdicts on BC reservations. Even if Article 16(4) is amended, there’s no guarantee it won’t be struck down. - Upper-Caste-Controlled Media
It already portrays BC reservations negatively, fostering insecurity among the public.
Therefore, placing the law in the Ninth Schedule is the wiser, safer path. It is limited to Telangana—a unique state with a high BC population. It can happen immediately; no need for long-term waiting. Some groups initially claimed GOs alone could achieve this, but when that proved impossible, they pivoted to the new argument of constitutional amendment under Articles 16(4) and 15(5). This is not an easy or quick process—it’s political theater by certain parties. Our appeal: BCs must not fall into this web of deceptive words, reject the “food at the tip of the tongue,” and agitate only for Ninth Schedule protection.
Comments
Post a Comment