Chuppala Nagesh Bhushan
How a film star’s electoral upset in Tamil Nadu has ignited fresh hope—and hard questions—among Telangana’s long-marginalised Backward Classes
There is a saying, attributed to no particular wit yet beloved of south Indian political romantics, that a lion is always a lion—however many jackals and other animals crowd the forest, there will be only one king. Vijay, the Tamil film star who last month shattered sixty years of Dravidian-party dominance in Tamil Nadu, is being invoked across the Deccan plateau as precisely that lion. The question animating activist meetings and WhatsApp forums from Warangal to Hyderabad is whether his improbable triumph contains a lesson—or even a blueprint—for the Backward Classes (BC) movement of Telangana.
T.
Chiranjeevulu, a retired Indian Administrative Service officer who chairs the
BC Intellectuals Forum in Hyderabad, has been among the most vocal in drawing
the parallel. Speaking to an audience of activists and young professionals, he
argued that Vijay’s victory was not merely a celebrity spectacle but a
political event with structural significance—one that dismantled several
comfortable assumptions about what it takes to win power in contemporary India.
“In 76 years of statehood, not a single chief minister has come
from the Backward Classes—a community that makes up 56 percent of the
population.”
Sixty Years of Dravidian Rule, and Its Lessons
Vijay’s
achievement deserves to be stated plainly. He had no political lineage, no
prior electoral experience, and the active hostility of the established
Dravidian parties whose combined grip on Tamil Nadu had held since the 1960s.
He spent nothing resembling the sums customarily associated with southern
Indian electioneering. Print and television media were largely unfriendly or
indifferent. He never visited several districts at all. And yet he won.
The
mechanism was social media and a generation that had grown weary of clientelism
dressed in ideological clothing. Youth in Tamil Nadu, much like their
counterparts in Telangana, want employment, economic security, transparent
governance, and social justice delivered with accountability. Vijay gave them a
mirror for those aspirations. Mr Chiranjeevulu argues that this is precisely
the template the BC movement must study: not the glamour, but the grammar.
An Arithmetic of Exclusion
The
political history of what is now Telangana—counting both its earlier
incarnation as part of united Andhra Pradesh and its brief separate existence
since 2014—is a history of remarkable caste concentration at the apex of power.
Since 1950, twenty individuals have held the office of chief minister across
Hyderabad State, united Andhra Pradesh, and Telangana. The arithmetic is
striking and, to the BC movement, damning.
Eleven of
those twenty were Reddys, who governed for a cumulative 39 years. Three Kammas
held power for nearly fifteen years. Two Velamas administered the state for
almost fourteen years. Brahmins, in two stints, ruled for five years and three
months. A single Vaishya served for just over a year. Dalit leaders—represented
only by the late Damodaram Sanjeevaiah—held the office for two years and two
months. The Scheduled Tribes have never produced a chief minister at all.
The Backward
Classes—formally defined as a socially and educationally disadvantaged group,
comprising according to government surveys 56.33 percent of Telangana’s
population—have never produced a chief minister. Not a single day in 76 years
of statehood. The three parties that have alternated in power—the Congress, the
Telugu Desam Party, and the Bharat Rashtra Samithi (now Telangana unit of the
Congress government)—have between them produced this record. Mr Chiranjeevulu’s
indictment is unsparing: all three, he argues, are structurally anti-BC.
Unemployment, Youth, and the Politics of Aspiration
The BC
movement’s structural grievance is amplified by a contemporary one. According
to the Periodic Labour Force Survey, Telangana’s unemployment rate stands at 5
percent—well above the national average of 3.1 percent. One in four young
people in the state is without work. The demographic math is simultaneously the
movement’s greatest challenge and its most potent resource. The Centre for the
Study of Developing Societies estimates that between 18 and 40 years of age,
Telangana is home to approximately 15 million young people.
This is the
generation Mr Chiranjeevulu calls the “Zanzad generation”—a Telugu coinage for
those who are educated, frustrated, and searching for political expression that
matches their scale of ambition. They do not want patronage. They want
structural change: jobs created by accountable governance, not distributed by
the discretion of caste patrons. It is in this desire, he argues, that the
Tamil Nadu lesson becomes applicable. Vijay won not because he promised more of
the same, but because he embodied a rejection of it.
Money, Media, and the Myth of Electoral Inevitability
One of the
most subversive implications of Vijay’s victory, for anyone inclined to accept
the conventional wisdom of Indian electoral politics, is its challenge to the
doctrine of money power. The received wisdom holds that elections in southern
India in particular are won through the distribution of cash, liquor, and
material inducements—that voters are effectively purchased rather than
persuaded. Vijay did not operate on this model, and he won. Mr Chiranjeevulu
draws the obvious inference: the primacy of money in elections is, at least
partly, a self-serving myth perpetuated by those who have money.
Media power
tells a similar story. Vijay received no meaningful support from Tamil Nadu’s
print or television establishments, which were largely aligned with the
incumbent parties. He reached voters through social media alone—through short
videos, local organisers, and the organic spread of political content among
young people who distrust television precisely because they recognise its
proprietors. For a BC movement that lacks both the capital to buy media and the
historical access to it, this is significant: the tools of mobilisation have
changed, and the new tools are cheap.
The Forest and Its Claimants
The deeper
argument being made by Mr Chiranjeevulu and the BC Intellectuals Forum is not
merely electoral. It is about the ownership of the state. In Telangana today,
the commanding heights of the economy—pharmaceuticals, cinema, manufacturing,
services—are occupied overwhelmingly by members of the same three or four
castes that have monopolised political power. BCs, Scheduled Castes, and
Scheduled Tribes are, as Mr Chiranjeevulu puts it with blunt statistical
confidence, invisible: not in business, not in the bureaucracy’s senior ranks,
not in the professions. The political and economic exclusions are mutually
reinforcing.
The
governing parties, in this account, have not merely failed to address this
exclusion—they have perpetuated it, using public resources and public debt to
enrich their caste constituencies while distributing just enough welfare to
forestall organised resistance. The resources of Telangana—water, land, mineral
rights, and government contracts—have been allocated in ways that compound the
advantage of the already advantaged.
Mr
Chiranjeevulu is not advocating caste reservation alone, though he supports its
expansion. His argument is more fundamental: that without political power, no
other form of inclusion is durable. Control of the state is the condition for
everything else—economic policy, educational investment, bureaucratic
appointments, and the allocation of development spending. The BC movement must,
therefore, aim not merely for representation within the existing power
structure but for its transformation.
What Must Be Done
The
practical prescription emerging from the BC Intellectuals Forum is threefold.
First, the movement must build its own digital infrastructure, reaching young
people on the platforms where they consume political information rather than
waiting for television coverage that will never come. Second, it must recruit
from the 15 million strong youth cohort not as passive supporters but as
organisers—people who understand that the structural change they want for
themselves requires the political project Mr Chiranjeevulu is describing.
Third, it must contest the next state elections with the explicit goal of state
power, not coalition leverage.
Mr
Chiranjeevulu is careful to note his own disinterestedness. He is a retired
bureaucrat with no electoral ambitions and no party affiliation. He came to the
movement, he says, because the injustice had become impossible to observe
without response—a sentiment that is either admirable civic commitment or the
self-presentation of a man who has, in fact, very definite political ideas. The
distinction may matter less than it appears. What the movement needs, he
argues, is intellectual clarity and organisational persistence, not charismatic
figureheads.
Victory Is Not a Metaphor
The Vijay
analogy has its limits. Tamil Nadu is not Telangana. A film star with pan-state
recognition is not easily replicated. The Dravidian parties, for all their
longevity, had specific vulnerabilities that the Congress-BRS duopoly in
Telangana does not perfectly mirror. And the BC movement itself is
heterogeneous—encompassing hundreds of communities with divergent economic
interests and varying degrees of political organisation.
But the
structural reading—that entrenched elite parties can be displaced by movements
that understand what a new generation wants, that money and mainstream media
are less decisive than the old parties believe, and that the aspirations of a
numerically dominant but politically invisible majority are a latent electoral
force of enormous potential—is more transferable than the surface story.
The martyrs
of the Telangana movement, whose sacrifices secured the state its separate
existence in 2014, did not, in the telling of BC activists, intend to deliver
power to the same castes that had always held it. The question now is whether
those aspirations—unrealised for over a decade—can find the organisational form
to redeem them. Mr Chiranjeevulu believes they can. Whether the lion he
envisions will actually emerge from the forest remains, for now, a matter of
faith, demographics, and the patience of the dispossessed. ■
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