Skip to main content

The fourth varna

India's ancient caste hierarchy has quietly acquired a fifth column: the balance sheet

INDIA'S traditional social order recognised four varnas. A fifth, unofficial one has since asserted itself over the other four: capital. Functionally, only three groups now matter in the old hierarchy's modern incarnation—the financier who endows the temple, the priest who guards it while mistaking his collar for a crown, and everyone else, whose labour, votes and loyalty are the raw material both groups quietly monetise.

Medals and money

Start with sport, where the mismatch between talent and treasury is unusually easy to measure. A disproportionate share of India's Olympic and Commonwealth hardware traces to a handful of unglamorous places: Haryana's wrestling akharas produced Sakshi Malik, Bajrang Punia and the Phogat sisters; Punjab supplied the spine of India's hockey golden age and still stocks the national squad; Manipur, with barely 0.2% of India's population, gave the country Mary Kom and Mirabai Chanu; Kerala furnished P.T. Usha and a steady stream of middle-distance runners few in Delhi could name. The medal map of India is a map of particular soils, particular coaches and particular poverty—not of particular temples.

Capital spending tells a different story. Gujarat now boasts the world's largest cricket stadium, a dedicated sports university and a fast-growing cluster of national training centres, underwritten by budgets that dwarf what Haryana or Manipur receive for the disciplines that actually stock the medal cabinet. No official is obliged to explain the gap between where medals are won and where stadiums rise. The bureaucrat best placed to ask tends also to have a pension worth protecting. He signs instead.

Print and payroll

The newsroom offers a milder but familiar pattern. Bylines skew upper-caste; ownership increasingly sits with a small number of conglomerates whose real interests lie in telecoms, ports, power and cement rather than in journalism itself. The canteen serves satvik food, the reporter feels commendably pure, and the ticker at the bottom of the screen rarely lingers on the debt-to-equity ratio of the group signing his cheque. Media-ownership concentration in India is now a matter of parliamentary record and of Reporters Without Borders' rankings, not of speculation. The anchor's caste is trivia; the owner's balance-sheet is the story that never quite gets anchored.

The same logic holds on the factory floor. The upper-caste supervisor migrates for the job, proud of his sacred thread and his vegetarian tiffin, without registering that he has become middle management inside someone else's empire. The owner's children are schooled in London, return home twice a year, endow a temple wing, and are garlanded at the factory gate by the very supervisor whose annual salary is a rounding error against the family's quarterly dividend. This is not, at bottom, a caste story. It merely wears one.

Ahimsa's fine print

There is a certain doctrinal convenience at work throughout. One may take milk from a cow without slaughtering her: that is animal husbandry, not violence. One may take honey from a hive without spilling blood: that is Ayurveda, not violence. By the same accounting, one may hollow out a public treasury, a river, a forest or a workforce's pension fund so long as nobody's throat is literally cut. Under Indian law that is, at worst, a regulatory matter, usually settled quietly and out of court.

The rishi retires

The old arrangement had the rishi advise the raja, and the raja lean on the rishi's blessing to rule. That bargain is dead. Elections are contested less with armies than with money, declared and undeclared, and money increasingly buys the data infrastructure that decides whose name sits comfortably on the electoral roll and whose does not. The Association for Democratic Reforms has spent two decades documenting the growing, and largely untraceable, share of election financing that neither it nor the Election Commission can fully follow. Democracy promised voters the right to choose their rulers. Capital has been quietly redlining the fine print.

An old grudge, compounding

The irony predates the republic. India's mercantile communities were, to a considerable extent, Jain or Buddhist before Brahminical orthodoxy pushed them out of the ritual fold centuries ago. They neither forgot the slight nor answered it with steel. Instead they rebuilt themselves as a merchant class, endowed the very temples that had once excluded them, and over a few generations turned the priesthood's descendants into salaried staff—garlanding factory gates, blessing vault gold, and now volunteering, unpaid, as the loudest defenders of that same capital online.

The warrior caste, meanwhile, has no sword left to raise and no war left to fight, and so has nothing left to sell but nostalgia. Only the priestly voice still carries any distance, and it has been rented out cheaply: a vegetarian canteen, a festival donation, and the standing right to feel holy while someone else's accountant counts the money.

Bark on, then. The bowl once filled in Nagpur is being refilled in Ahmedabad—and the receipts, unlike the rhetoric, are a matter of public record for anyone willing to file the paperwork.

Comments

Popular posts from this blog

Unveiling the "Real Majority" of India

Unveiling the "Real Majority": Divya Dwivedi’s Critique of the Hindu Majority Narrative * In contemporary Indian discourse, the notion of a "Hindu majority" is often taken as an unassailable fact, with official statistics frequently citing approximately 80% of India’s population as Hindu. This framing shapes political campaigns, cultural narratives, and even national identity. However, philosopher and professor at IIT Delhi, Divya Dwivedi, challenges this narrative in her provocative and incisive work, arguing that the "Hindu majority" is a constructed myth that obscures the true social composition of India. For Dwivedi, the "real majority" comprises the lower-caste communities—historically marginalized and oppressed under the caste system—who form the numerical and social backbone of the nation. Her critique, developed in collaboration with philosopher Shaj Mohan, offers a radical rethinking of Indian society, exposing the mechanisms of power t...

Nehru: Past, Present, and Future

  Based on a speech/talk in Telugu by Dr. Devaraju Maharaju  Some people say Nehru belongs to the past. Personally, I believe he belongs not only to the past but to the present and the future as well. Building a nation requires immense effort and sacrifice — and Nehru demonstrated both through his life. His life stands as an ideal not just for the older generation, but for today's youth and generations yet to come. I hold this belief firmly. He was a visionary, an atheist, a rationalist — but setting all of that aside, there is one thing that must be spoken of without fail: Scientific Temper . The man who coined the term "scientific temper" and gave it to the world was Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. This phrase is now used globally, and people must remember that it was Nehru who gave us those words. The Roots of Scientific Thought in India Did scientific temper begin with Nehru? Not quite. India was actually home to the world's earliest materialists. It was India tha...

THE DRAVIDIAN PEOPLE OF SOUTH ASIA

Dravidians are the most ancient ethno-linguistic group of South Asia. The migrations of the Indo-Aryans pushed them deeper into the subcontinent. But a few isolated groups still remain to tell the tale. They may not have the Ancestral South Indian (ASI) of most of the Dravidian people, but the Brahui language still spoken in Balochistan in the areas around Quetta, is tell tale evidence of our history.  The Brahui is an ethnic group residing in Balochistan and Sindh, in Pakistan. Their distant linguistic cousins reside in the states of Karnataka and Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Telangana in India.  The Brahui are an excellent example of this phenomenon. A Dravidian ethnic group residing in the deserts of Sindh and Balochistan in Pakistan, they share DNA with their Sindhi, Balochi and provincial neighbours of different ethnicities. But their nearest cousins are located in the states of Karnataka in India. Causal relationships between ethnic groups in the Indian Subcontinen...